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I. INTRODUCTION
“We are summoning the demon,” Tesla founder and tech
entrepreneur Elon Musk said while speaking at M.I.T. in 2014.1
Musk was warning that artificial intelligence technology (AI) would
eventually accelerate to the point that it could not be controlled by
humans and would pose an existential threat to humanity.2 While
these statements may exaggerate the threat posed by AI, genuine
questions do exist relating to the potential for AI to play a
transformative role in our daily lives, the economy, and the geopolitical balance of power. While the U.S. currently is at the
forefront of research and development of AI, China is seeking to
utilize this technology to aid its rise as an economic and military
power. In pursuit of these strategic goals, Chinese companies have
begun to invest heavily in U.S. AI companies. This has sparked
concerns in Washington that Chinese investment in the U.S. AI
industry is being used as a vehicle for the technology transfer to
Chinese government entities.3
In light of these national security concerns, Senator John
Cornyn (R-TX) introduced a bill to Congress that increases
restrictions on foreign investment, which may target Chinese
companies investing in U.S. AI companies.4 While the bill may
address legitimate security concerns, it also has the potential to
negatively impact the U.S. AI industry and the U.S. economy as a
whole. This analysis will weigh the national security concerns with
the economic drawbacks to determine whether Senator Cornyn’s
legislation will be an effective regulatory reform. Part I will discuss
AI systems, their national security implications, and China’s
strategic focus on this technology. Part II will discuss how Chinese
investment in U.S. AI industry has the potential to become a
pipeline for technology transfer to China. Part III will examine how
the U.S. government manages national security risk in foreign
investment transactions, discuss past U.S. foreign investment
regulatory actions, in addition to introducing the current proposal
for reform. Finally, Part IV will analyze the potential economic
impact to the U.S. AI industry from increased investment
restrictions and recommend policy alternatives to mitigate these
impacts.
1. Maureen Dowd, Elon Musk’s Billion-Dollar Crusade to Stop the A.I.
Apocalypse,
VANITY FAIR,
(Mar.
26,
2017), www.vanityfair.com/
news/2017/03/elon-musk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-ai-space-x.
2. Id.
3. Michael Brown & Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy:
How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic
Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, U.S. DEF.
INNOVATION
UNIT
EXPERIMENTAL
2
(Feb.
2017),
new.reorgresearch.com/data/documents/20170928/59ccf7de70c2f.pdf.
4. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, S. 2098, 115th Cong.
(2017), www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2098.
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II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ITS
APPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
A. AI Systems and their Applications
AI has a wide variety of industrial and defense applications
that have led to strategic imperatives to acquire this technology.
However, it is difficult to understand what is exactly meant by the
term “artificial intelligence” because there is currently no widely
accepted definition for it.5 Most definitions of AI focus on replicating
human characteristics like consciousness, self-awareness, language
use, and the abilities to learn, adapt and reason within a computer
system or an algorithm.6 An AI system can consist of both hardware
components, like a drone or robot, and software components, like a
program running on networked computers.7 The most widely-used
approaches to defining AI focus on the achievement of goals through
computational processes.8 An ideal AI system is able to synthesize
large amounts of data, recognize complex patterns within those
data sets, draw conclusions based on those patterns, and then make
predictions or take action based on those conclusions.
Categorizing AI technologies can be as difficult as defining
them, as many companies often mix and match different
technologies according to their needs. However, AI systems are
generally categorized by functionality or by business application.9
Accordingly, AI systems for industrial applications commonly break
down into five categories: robotics & autonomous vehicles, computer
vision, language, virtual agents, and machine learning.10 Virtual
agents, which are computer programs that can converse with
humans like Amazon’s “Alexa” or Apple’s “Siri,” can play a song for
you, order your dinner, or give you an answer to a hotly contested
trivia question with a simple voice command. Self-driving cars are
another high profile industrial application of AI, with driverless
fleets from Tesla, Uber, Google’s Waymo, and Intel’s Mobileye
already in the testing phase.
Despite the excitement surrounding these consumer
applications of AI, the bulk of investment in the technology is going

5. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 353, 359
(2016).
6. Id. at 360.
7. Id. at 362.
8. Id. at 361.
9. Id.
10. Jacques Bughin et al., Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier?
4 (McKinsey & Co. Discussion Paper, June 2017), www.mckinsey.com/~/
media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/Our%20Insights/How%2
0artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20comp
anies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx.
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into machine learning applications. Machine learning applications
received almost 60% of the investment from outside the industry in
2016, in large part because they enable other AI technologies.11
Machine learning is based on “algorithms that learn from data
without relying on rules-based programming in order to draw
conclusions or direct an action.”12 Machine learning has the
potential to provide exponential advances in robotic automation and
decision-making applications that continually optimize outcomes.13
Combining machine-learning systems with manufacturing
processes could supercharge productivity gains for the
manufacturing industry in particular. At this stage, however,
adoption of AI is largely limited to the technology sector, as other
industries are uncertain of the return on investment or how the
technology can be adapted to their business needs.14

Investment in AI is primarily driven by private firms in the
technology sector. Digital giants Google and China’s Baidu
currently dominate private investment in AI, spending an
estimated $20-30 billion in 2016.15 The bulk of this investment has
been poured into research and development, with a small amount

11. Id. at 12.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Daniel Alderman & Jonathan Ray, Best Frenemies Forever: Artificial
Intelligence, Emerging Technologies, and China-US Strategic Competition,
INST. ON GLOB. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 2 (Feb. 28, 2017),
escholarship.org/uc/item/2pq268gz.
14. Bughin, supra note 10, at 10.
15. Id. at 4.
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directed to acquisitions of other AI companies. The market for AI
start-up companies is growing significantly, with venture
capitalists spending $4-5 billion on greenfield investments in
2016.16 Although the U.S. and China are leading investment in AI,
many other countries are beginning to dedicate significant portions
of their budget to AI. The South Korean government recently
announced it will spend $1 billion over the next five years on AI
research and development, which would equal the AI budget of the
U.S. within a few years.17 Given the many commercial applications
of AI and the potential for it to revolutionize manufacturing, it is no
surprise that corporations as well as national governments are
making investment in AI a priority.

B. The National Security Implications of AI
While the transformative industrial applications of AI are
being recognized, U.S. national security experts also envision that
AI applications will have a similar impact on the defense sector. AI
may significantly improve military and intelligence capabilities,
and analysts see its potential impact on military superiority as
being on par with the development of airplanes and nuclear
weaponry.18 The proliferation of military drones is one example of
AI’s potential military usage, but this phenomenon may be a mere
prelude to the next generation of AI-enhanced automated
weaponry. AI will likely allow more robotic support for combat
personnel and accelerate the shift from manned to unmanned
combat missions.19 This is evidenced by the dramatic increase in the
market for military robots, which grew from $2.4 billion to $7.5
billion during the period of 2000 to 2015, and is expected to reach
$16.5 billion by 2025.20 Combining these drones with AI systems
that allow them to operate autonomously in theatre has the
potential to transform military power and warfare.
Another impact of AI technology on defense systems is that
military and intelligence activities that currently require many
people will be achievable with fewer people or without people at
all.21 This is important for surveillance operations, whose efficiency
can be greatly improved with the application of AI systems.
Surveillance monitoring operations that would have in the past
16. Greenfield investments are a type of foreign direct investment where a
foreign company invests in a new venture. Id. at 6.
17. Greg Allen & Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security,
THE BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD
KENNEDY
SCHOOL
OF
GOVERNMENT
23
(July
23,
2017),
www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20%20final.pdf.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 13-14.
21. Id. at 12.

284

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:55

required a massive government budget and personnel can now be
conducted with only a few thousand people.22 This application is
important for the Chinese government because it is looking to
increase the effectiveness of the surveillance that it conducts on its
large population. AI and machine-learning are also foundational to
the future of cybersecurity, which has a growing role in the defense
industry. AI-enhanced cyber tools can reduce the need for humanintensive tasks, which can dramatically increase the ability and
productivity of cyber-warfare.23
The military applications of AI has led the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) to announce their “Third Offset Strategy” to ensure
U.S. military superiority through the pursuit of next-generation
technology.24 The initial stage of the strategy involves exploiting AI
and autonomy technologies by using them in battle networks that
coordinate command, control, and communications operations in
theatre.25 The DOD has acknowledged, however, that this strategy
is implemented in part to pace competitors like Russia and China
who are also developing these capabilities.26 It has indicated that
Russia and China have dedicated substantial resources to counternetwork operations including cyber capabilities.27 In regards to AI
technology, Russia has announced a plan to have 30% of combat
power in remote-controlled and autonomous robotic platforms by
2030.28 While information on the Chinese military is opaque, it has
already announced an intention to develop cruise missiles with an
AI system in response to the U.S. Navy’s semi-autonomous guided
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile.29
The DOD has enacted use restrictions on automated systems
using lethal force, but there are significant concerns that other
states may not exercise such restraint.30 U.S. companies are also
exercising restraint when it comes to the application of AI to
military technology. Google’s DeepMind, largely seen as the world
leader in AI research has a strong stance against the military or

22. Id. at 18.
23. Id.
24. Richard Purcell, Hagel’s ‘Third Offset Strategy’ Key to Maintaining U.S.
Military
Supremacy,
WORLD
POL.
REV.
(Dec.
29,
2014),
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14744/hagel-s-third-offsetstrategy-key-to-maintaining-u-s-military-supremacy.
25. Cheryl Pellerin, Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters
America’s Military Deterrence, DEP’T OF DEF. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 31, 2016),
www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offsetstrategy-bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Allen & Chan, supra note 17, at 21.
29. John Markoff & Matthew Rosenberg, China’s Intelligent Weaponry Gets
Smarter, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/
technology/artificial-intelligence-china-united-states.html.
30. Allen & Chan, supra note 17, at 21.
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surveillance use of the AI technology.31 When Google acquired the
company, the two organizations agreed that Google would prohibit
the use of its AI technology for such purposes.32 When Google
acquired Boston Dynamics and Schaft, two leading developers of
robotics research and development, they also agreed that these
firms would not pursue military or intelligence contracts.33 Despite
this pushback, the potential disruptive impact that AI may have on
warfare and military superiority has caused the U.S. government to
place strategic focus on the development of AI systems.

C. China’s Strategic Focus on AI Technology
Investment
In addition to the large investment that Chinese companies
have made in AI, the Chinese government has also placed a
strategic focus on this technology. “Made in China 2025” is the
Chinese government’s new strategic initiative to transform its
manufacturing industry through the application of next-generation
technology.34 Over the past two decades, China has become the
world’s largest manufacturer, but it is still plagued by issues like
the lack of core technologies and a lack of independent innovation.35
The Chinese government believes that the development of AI, in
addition to other technologies, can help the country achieve this
manufacturing transformation.36 In response to the government’s
initiative, Chinese firms like Baidu and Tencent are spending
heavily to build up large, skilled research teams in machinelearning and AI.37 Baidu collaborated with the Chinese government
to set up a new national laboratory in Beijing dedicated to keeping
China at the forefront of this technology.38 Given the lack of
independent innovation in China and the plan’s aggressive targets,
emphasis on home grown technological development may not be

31. Id. at 52.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions
Built on Local Protections 6 (July 2017), www.belfercenter.org/
sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf.
35. XINHUA FIN. AGENCY, AI Becomes Key Facet for Made in China 2025
(Mar. 9, 2017, 4:35 PM), en.xfafinance.com/html/Dont_Miss/2017/310664.shtml.
36. Id.
37. Tom Simonite, It’s Too Late to Stop China from Becoming an AI
Superpower, WIRED (June 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), www.wired.com/story/americachina-ai-ascension/.
38. Phil Stewart, The U.S. Weighs Restricting Chinese Investment in
Artificial Intelligence, THOMSON REUTERS (Jun. 13, 2017, 2:53 PM),
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-artificialintelligence/u-s-weighsrestricting-chinese-investment-in-artificial-intelligence-idUSKBN1942OX.
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enough. Chinese companies need to pursue foreign direct
investment to gain access to advanced AI technology.39
Given that the U.S. is currently the global leader in
technological innovation, it makes sense that Chinese companies
have now become significant investors in the U.S. AI industry.
During the 2010-2016 period, Chinese companies participated in
fifty-one AI financings, with twenty-nine deals and $470 million in
financing alone in the 2015-16 period.40 The Chinese tech giant
Tencent created an AI lab in Seattle, near the campus of Amazon,
and promptly began investing in Silicon Valley AI companies.41
Baidu acquired the U.S. firm xPerception, which makes vision
perception software with robotic and virtual reality applications.42
While China’s past investments in the technology sector were
limited to acquisitions or joint ventures, greenfield, or start-up
investments, are becoming an increasing preferred method of
investment. These include deals with Chinese venture capital firms
like Sinovation, which has invested in 25 artificial intelligence
start-up companies in the U.S.43 Greenfield investment is becoming
a popular mode of investment because it is less politically risky than
high-profile mergers and acquisitions.44
In sum, the rapid growth and development of AI technology has
major implications for both industrial and defense applications. AI
enhancements to the manufacturing industry have the potential to
provide major productivity boosts, while AI-enhanced weaponry has
the potential to reshape the battlefield of the future. The U.S. is
currently the global leader in AI technology, but the Chinese
government has placed strategic emphasis on enhancing its
technological capabilities. Limitations on the Chinese innovative
capabilities have caused Chinese companies to invest in the U.S. AI
industry in order to better access technological enhancements.

III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PIPELINE
A. Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer
One way to describe the influx of Chinese investment in the US
AI industry is strategic asset seeking behavior. Strategic asset
39. Ann R. Thryft, Made in China 2025: AI in U.S. Factories? Not There Yet,
ASPENCORE
GLOB.
REP.
(Aug.
3,
2017),
www.eetimes.com/
document.asp?doc_id=1332106.
40. Brown & Singh, supra note 3, at 7.
41. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
42. Stewart, supra note 38.
43. Brown & Singh, supra note 3, at 8.
44. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from
Japan’s Experience in the 1980s, DELOITTE U.S. CHINA SERV. GROUP 15 (Nov.
2008), ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/MilhauptFinalEnglish.pdf.
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seeking behavior constitutes the funding of foreign investment to
gain access to technologies that would otherwise not be available in
the home country.45 The transfer of technological know-how and
knowledge from the developed country facilitates an increase in
productivity in the developing country with the added benefit of
knowledge spillovers to other domestic firms and industries.46
Investments in centers of innovation, like Silicon Valley, are an
important source of technology diffusion for developing nations like
China.47 This strategy for acquiring advanced technology is not new,
however, as China has used this method ever since the Law of Joint
Ventures was promulgated in 1979.48
Although patented technology can be legally protected from
transfer to the foreign investing country by the use of licensing
agreements, it is more difficult to control “know-how” or knowledge
relating to a company’s technology.49 Once knowledge is released
into the industry, it is impossible to retrieve and may be used by
anyone. For this reason, companies often seek to protect their
knowledge and technology from transfer by foreign investors
through nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements.50 However,
several aspects of the advanced technology industry in the US,
which will be explored below, make it easier for this technology to
be transferred across borders. Among the factors critical to this
technology transfer are the diffuse and open nature of the AI
industry, the off-the-shelf nature of US military technology, the
close connections between the Chinese and U.S. AI industries, and
the corresponding close connections between Chinese tech
companies and the Chinese Communist Party. The confluence of
these factors create a virtual pipeline for the transfer of AI
technology from U.S. companies to Chinese government entities.

B. The Diffuse and Open Nature of AI Technology
To begin with, the inherent nature of AI technology makes it
conducive
to
technology
transfer.
Major
technological
advancements in the past, like nuclear technology, have required
substantial infrastructure investments making those operations
difficult to conceal.51 The ability of AI systems to be developed with
minimal resources and in multiple locations make it difficult to
45. Edmund Amann & Swati Virmani, Foreign Direct Investment and
Reverse Technology Spillovers: The Effect on Total Factor Productivity, OECD
J. ECON. STUD. 129, 135 (2014), dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-20145jxx56vcxn0n (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
46. Id. at 136.
47. Id. at 132.
48. Id.
49. RALPH H. FOLSOM, FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 28
(2016).
50. Id.
51. Scherer, supra note 5, at 369.
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determine where the technology is actually located.52 AI systems
can be developed with limited visible infrastructure and their
individual components can be located far away from one another.53
The interaction between the variety of components developed in
disparate geographic locations can complicate the ability of any
singular corporate entity, let alone a government regulator, to
monitor their transfer.54 Participants in an AI project need not be
related in any fashion and some systems are even being developed
in open-source libraries available to be accessed by anyone. This
diffusion of activity also makes it possible for individual components
of these systems to be developed outside of the system developer’s
control.55 The open and diffuse nature of AI systems sets them apart
from previous disruptive technologies and makes it more likely that
they can be transferred across borders.

C. Changing Nature of U.S. Military Procurement
Another factor aiding the transfer of U.S. technology to China
is the changing nature of military procurement. Over the past two
decades, the DOD has moved toward a system of procuring
advanced military technologies from commercial sources.56 This
“off-the-shelf” procurement strategy allows the DOD to outsource
the cost of research and development as well as externalize the costs
of introducing these new technologies to the market.57 In addition
to cost efficiencies for the government, this method also helps the
military avoid being locked into certain technology configurations
that would otherwise be outdated by the time of production.58
Emerging defense technologies now increasingly come from the
private sector, making the U.S. tactical advantage on the battlefield
increasingly dependent on the private corporations.59 Given the
liberal U.S. foreign investment laws, it is possible that foreign
entities may now be able to invest in the early stages of defense
technology companies and even have the potential to purchase these
companies on the open market. Not only would this allow the
Chinese government to access the latest U.S. defense technology
through one of its tech companies, but it would also make these U.S.
companies off limits for the DOD.60 When advanced technology has
the potential to determine military superiority, potential Chinese
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 371.
55. Id. at 370.
56. David R. Fitzgerald, Leaving the Back Door Open: How Export Control
Reform’s Deregulation May Harm America’s Security, 15 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON.
65, 69 (2014).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 69-70.
59. Id. at 69.
60. Stewart, supra note 38.
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access to U.S. military procurement streams creates significant
national security concerns.

D. Integration of U.S. and Chinese AI Industries
In addition, the integration of U.S. and Chinese AI industries
increase the likelihood of technology transfer. The connection
between these industries is evident within the commercial sphere
and in academia. 61 One area within the commercial sphere where
co-mingling occurs is in research and development centers. Chinese
companies have set up research centers in U.S. technology hubs in
order to increase access to industry knowledge and share ideas with
U.S. entrepreneurs in the field. In 2013, Baidu set up the Institute
for Deep Learning in Silicon Valley, where it created software
matching skills in human speech two years before it was
accomplished by the Microsoft AI lab.62 In addition, the Zhong Guan
Cun Innovation Center, a research center and start-up incubator
was opened in Santa Clara, California in 2016 with significant
funding from the Chinese government.63 U.S. companies have also
funded research and development centers in China that work on AI
systems.64 This interconnectedness has notable benefits for the U.S.
AI industry as these exchanges facilitate access to Chinese AI
experts and ideas, but it also increases the potential that AI
technology incubated in these centers will be transferred back to
China for use by the Chinese government.
The academic setting is another place where technology
transfer is increasingly taking place.
A large amount of cutting-edge AI technology is being
developed in U.S. universities, and policies of openness, exchange,
and academic freedom in these institutions make new developments
easier to access by foreign nationals. At present, it is estimated that
25% of the graduate students at U.S. universities in STEM (Science,
Technology, Engineering & Mathematics) fields are Chinese foreign
nationals.65 As a result, Chinese graduate students master the
technologies that will later become critical to next generation
industrial and military systems. In addition to the number of
Chinese nationals enrolled in AI programs at U.S. universities as
students, Chinese government employees have been known to audit
AI courses to gain access to technological know-how.66 Professors at
Stanford University, a major hub of AI research near Silicon Valley,
have noticed this phenomenon.67 It is particularly pronounced as
61. Alderman & Ray, supra note 13, at 2.
62. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
63. Brown & Singh, supra note 3, at 18.
64. Alderman & Ray, supra note 13, at 3.
65. Brown & Singh, supra note 3, at 17.
66. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
67. Id.
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many of their students prefer to watch lectures from home on video,
while Chinese nationals auditing the course will instead be present
at the front of the class.68 All in all, the industry is marked by
extreme fluidity with and between both countries’ commercial
industry and academia, which are both connected to the defense
industrial base.69

E. China’s Tech Companies in Close Cooperation with
State
While the above factors have shown how U.S. AI technology
can be more easily transferred to Chinese companies, the close
cooperation of Chinese tech giants with the Chinese Communist
Party makes it possible for these technologies to be accessed by the
Chinese government entities. In the age of Xi Jinping, the dividing
line between private industry and state-subsidized or controlled
companies has become increasingly cloudy. Chinese technology
companies, who once shunned association with the Chinese
Communist Party are now actively promoting their connection to
it.70
More than thirty-five tech companies have instituted party
committees in recent years that assess a company’s objectives to
ensure that they do not stray too far from party objectives.71 In order
to curry favor with the government, three of the biggest tech groups,
Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent – have been careful to demonstrate
loyalty to the party. Robin Li, the chairman of Chinese tech giant
Baidu, is also a Chinese Communist Party National Committee
member.72 Ties to the party that would previously have been
obscured to please foreign investors, are now seen as being good for
their brands. There is also a perception that no company can get
ahead in China without aligning itself with the party’s goals.
A close connection to the Chinese government with a national
strategic focus, means that it will not be long before that technology
is accessed by the Chinese military. One example of this is the
Chinese company Iflytek, which created an award-winning speech
recognition technology, and has a close relationship with the
government for the development of surveillance technology.73 While
the Chinese Communist Party has the right to be concerned with
the growing power of tech giants amassing cash and user data, the
government under Xi Jinping will keep them close to make sure that
68. Id.
69. Alderman & Ray, supra note 13, at 2.
70. Emily Z. Feng, Chinese Tech Groups Display Closer Ties w Communist
Party, THE FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), www.ft.com/content/6bc839c0-ace6-11e7aab9-abaa44b1e130?mhq5j=e5.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
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any advanced technology that is transferred from U.S. industries is
made available for government purposes.
In sum, strategic asset seeking behavior by Chinese companies
in the U.S. has enabled technology transfer through investment and
acquisitions. The open and diffuse nature of AI systems, the off-theshelf nature of defense procurement, the integrated Chinese and
U.S. AI industries, and the connection of Chinese tech companies to
the Chinese Communist Party all make for an environment
conducive to technology transfer. When you combine this open
environment with a Chinese national strategy focused on the
acquisition and development of AI technologies, it demonstrates the
potential for a direct pipeline from U.S. technological development
to Chinese military advancement. The potential for this
technological pipeline has sparked national security concerns and
calls for increased regulation of Chinese investment in the AI
industry.

IV. THE U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REGULATORY REGIME
A. Foreign Investment and National Security
The U.S. has historically taken a liberal policy toward foreign
direct investment over the last several decades, emphasizing a
maximum degree of openness to foreign investment.74 The domestic
benefits of foreign investment have included the rescue of iconic
U.S. companies, the injection of innovative new business practices,
and increases in the pool of venture capital. 75 Despite these
economic benefits, foreign direct investment also brings with it
certain national security risks. In particular, foreign investment
may threaten national security by rendering U.S. companies
excessively reliant on a foreign-owned entity. It may allow a foreign
entity to use newly acquired technology to harm U.S. national
interests, or cause infiltration or sabotage by foreign government.76
An open foreign investment climate increases the potential for
acquisitions by foreign companies that transfer assets to an
individual or company that answers to a foreign government.77 With
these security concerns in mind, the fundamental challenge
becomes balancing the national security risks with the economic
benefits of foreign investment.78
74. Joana Rubin Travalini, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
Achieving a Balance between National Economy Benefits and National Security
Interests, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 779, 781 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Timothy Webster, Why Does the United States Oppose Asian Foreign
Direct Investment? 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 213, 244 (2017).
77. Travalini, supra note 74, at 781.
78. Id. at 779.
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B. Foreign Investment Regulation in the U.S.
In order to mitigate the national security risk inherent in
foreign investment, Congress created the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). President Gerald Ford
agreed to create CFIUS in response to congressional studies that
indicated the U.S. did not maintain an adequate mechanism for
monitoring foreign investments.79 The committee is charged with
monitoring foreign investment and “coordinating implementation of
United States policy on such investment”80 The current CFIUS
process begins when a voluntary notice is filed by the foreign
investor with the Treasury Department. That filing is then
circulated to committee members, including twelve U.S.
government agencies, with Treasury, Homeland Security,
Commerce and the Justice Department taking the most active
roles.81 The Office of International Investment of the Department of
Treasury generally administers the review, but the DOD is
particularly influential when evaluating national security
implications.82
CFIUS often focuses on transactions where the target U.S.
company has export-controlled technologies or when the transaction
may result in the absence of U.S. companies supplying technology
that is critical to national defense.83 After a thirty-day review, the
committee must approve the transaction or determine that an
additional forty-five-day investigation is warranted.84 In assessing
the national security risk, CFIUS evaluates the threat level of the
particular buyer in addition to assessing the vulnerability of the
particular assets being acquired.85 After an investigation is
conducted, CFIUS may elect to enter into an agreement with the
parties that mitigates the national security risks of the transaction
by imposing conditions on the foreign company.86 Mitigation
agreements may include selling off certain assets, restricting access
to certain locations, restricting certain technologies to specific
personnel, or submitting to additional inspections or reporting
requirements.87
79. Id. at 783.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Travalini, supra note 74, at 784.
83. Id. at 786.
84. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, 216 (Kay C. Georgi & Paul M. Lalonde eds. 2013).
85. Stewart A. Baker et al., Navigating Joint CFIUS and DSS Jurisdiction,
Steptoe & Johnson, LLP (Mar. 3, 2015), www.steptoe.com/publications10272.html.
86. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 84, at 217.
87. Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, Chinese Investment in the United
States: Recent Trends and the Policy Agenda, RHODIUM GROUP 90 (Dec. 9, 2016),

2018]

Smart Machines and Smarter Policy

293

Alternatively, CFIUS may decide to submit a report to the
President, who then has fifteen days to decide whether to permit or
block the transaction.88 The ability of the President to block foreign
investment transactions with national security risks was
established by the 1988 Exon-Florio Act, which is the statutory
authority supporting CFIUS.89 Congress passed Exon-Florio to give
the President authority to block such transactions when it is
determined by CFIUS that the “foreign interest exercising control
might take action that impairs the national security.”90 The legal
standard for the President to block or suspend transactions under
the CFIUS statue is the existence of “credible evidence” that the
transaction does not just impact national security, but that it
“threatens to impair,” or poses a risk to national security.91 In
addition, the President must find that other provisions in the law
provide him with inadequate authority to address these national
security risks.92
Congress broadened the authority of CFIUS even further by
passing the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
(FINSA), which amended the Exon-Florio statute.93 FINSA
expanded the CFIUS mandate to cover critical infrastructure and
technologies as well as strengthened congressional oversight by
extending time periods for investigation and review of
transactions.94 Another important aspect of FINSA was that it
made a CFIUS investigation mandatory if the investment
transaction involved a foreign government entity or a state-owned
enterprise (SOE).95 This was important to China because a large
portion of Chinese foreign investment flows through SOEs.
In sum, CFIUS seeks to monitor foreign investments to protect
national security, while maintaining an open U.S. investment
environment. Because the term “national security” is never defined,
however, the committee must make a determination on a case-bycase basis. The rules are intentionally ambiguous to give regulators
the discretion that helps protect CFIUS classified intelligence
assessment, but this ambiguity is one of the leading criticisms of
foreign investors. 96 Investors can never fully exclude the possibility
that a foreign investment transaction will threaten national
rhg.com/reports/chinese-investment-in-the-united-states-recent-trends-andthe-policy-agenda.
88. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 84, at 217.
89. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565 (2015).
90. Travalini, supra note 74, at 784.
91. James K. Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), CONG. RES. SERV. 41-42 (Oct. 11, 2017), fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
92. FOLSOM, supra note 49, at 274.
93. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4565(2)(E) (2015).
94. Travalini, supra note 74, at 793.
95. Id. at 795.
96. Webster, supra note 76, at 269.
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security, making it difficult for them to know when a CFIUS filing
will be necessary.97 In addition, once CFIUS renders its opinion
there is no way to challenge it because the Exon-Florio amendment
prohibits judicial review of the President’s decision.98 Exon-Florio
and FINSA give CFIUS broad powers that it has exercised in the
past to restrict foreign investment in the U.S. due to national
security concerns.

C. Past High-Profile CFIUS Action Against Chinese
Investors
Despite this broad authority, CFIUS review has only very
rarely prompted the President to block a transaction or order a
forced divestiture.99 One major forced divestiture occurred in 1990,
when the U.S. directed China National Aero-Technology Import and
Export Corporation (CATIC) to divest its acquisition of MAMCO
Manufacturing, Inc., a Seattle-based aircraft manufacturing
firm.100 This divestiture was ordered because of concerns over
CATIC’s potential acquisition through MAMCO of restricted
technology that would have otherwise required a dual-use export
license.101 Dual-use export licenses are required for companies that
export products with both civilian and military applications.102 If a
CFIUS filing describes any business activities that require such a
license, it can trigger additional scrutiny from the Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls.103 As a result of these concerns, President
George H.W. Bush gave CATIC three months to sell off its new
acquisition under government watch.104
However, the President does not always have to take action for
a deal to collapse under CFIUS scrutiny. Oftentimes, the publicity
surrounding a CFIUS investigation alone is enough to negatively
impact the transaction. From 1990-2017, firms in nearly half of the
transactions investigated by CFIUS have chosen to withdraw
rather than face scrutiny.105 One of the most high profile voluntary
withdrawals occurred in 2005 when China’s National Offshore Oil
Company (CNOOC) decided to drop its bid to acquire U.S. oil
company Unocal in part due to CFIUS concerns.106 During
97. Id. at 246.
98. Id. at 270.
99. FOLSOM, supra note 49, at 278.
100. Jackson, supra note 91, at 6.
101. Id.
102. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 84, at 217.
103. Id.
104. Stuart Auerbach, President Tells China to Sell Seattle Firm, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
3,
1990),
www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/1990/02/03/president-tells-china-to-sell-seattle-firm/4e2521e23ba1-4d9b-a864-ec512a607a28/?utm_term=.086256c38873.
105. Jackson, supra note 91, at 25.
106. Travalini, supra note 74, at 788.
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CNOOC’s failed acquisition of Unocal, CFIUS review perceived a
threat to the energy security of the U.S. because the state-owned
and state-subsidized nature of CNOOC made the transaction seem
like a strategic takeover rather than a purely commercial
transaction.107 Concerns were also raised that the transaction
would allow for the transfer of certain advanced drilling
technologies to China.108 Because of the scrutiny from CFIUS,
CNOOC eventually withdrew its bid and Unocal accepted a bid that
was considerably less from the American company Chevron.109
In another high profile voluntary withdrawal, Huawei
Technologies withdrew its offer in 2008 to purchase 3Com, a
company that specialized in networking equipment and software.110
3Com produced the Tipping Point cybersecurity software that was,
at that time, used by various U.S. defense firms to prevent outside
groups from accessing their confidential databases.111 The offer was
reportedly withdrawn after failure to agree with CFIUS on a
mitigation agreement.112 Commentators were split over whether
there was a real national security threat, but concerns over the
potential for facilitation of cyber-espionage surfaced, given the
company’s close ties to the Chinese military.113 However, a report
by the House Intelligence Committee disclosed no concrete evidence
of a national security threat and this information was corroborated
by the fact that Huawei had operated all over the world without any
reports of security breaches.114 Even 3Com’s offer to divest itself of
the anti-hacking software failed to move President George W.
Bush’s administration to approve the transaction.115
In 2017, President Trump exercised his authority under ExonFlorio by blocking a Chinese investor from taking over the Lattice
Semiconductor Corporation.116 This was only the fourth time in the
history of CFIUS that a president had blocked a foreign takeover of
a U.S. company based on national security risks.117 The
explanations given by the White House for blocking the transaction
were the “importance of semiconductor supply chain integrity to the
United States government, and the use of Lattice products by the
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 789.
110. Steven R. Weisman, Sale of 3Com to Huawei is Derailed by U.S.
Security Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008), www.nytimes.com/
2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-3com.1.10258216.html.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Webster, supra note 76, at 246.
114. Id.
115. Weisman, supra note 110.
116. David McLaughlin, Jennifer Jacobs, & Miao Han, Trump Blocks ChinaBacked Bid for Chipmaker Over Security Risk, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 13, 2017, 3:00
PM),
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-13/trump-blocks-chinabacked-bid-for-chipmaker-over-security-risk.
117. Id.
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United States government.”118 However, since President Trump
was elected, some have seen a reduced willingness to resolve
national security risks in favor of negotiated mitigation and
increased consensus in prohibiting transactions.119 Given that there
also seems to be an emerging bipartisan Congressional consensus
that CFIUS needs to be strengthened, there is a strong potential for
new foreign investment restrictions.120

D. New Potential Legislation Updating CFIUS
Current congressional efforts to revise the CFIUS procedures
are driven broadly by concerns that CFIUS can negotiate mitigation
agreements without extensive oversight.121 Defense Secretary Jim
Mattis has called CFIUS “outdated,” and leading Republican
Senator Cornyn is spearheading CFIUS reform based on concerns
that China is using investment as part of a strategy to leapfrog U.S.
technology advantages.122 These statements reflect a widespread
belief among policymakers that current CFIUS procedures are
inadequate to combat the growing threat of technology transfer to
China.123
Senator Cornyn’s proposed legislation, the Foreign Risk
Review Modernization Act (FRRMR) has the potential to enshrine
new foreign investment restrictions into CFIUS and impact Chinese
investment in AI technology.124 The bill would expand the
jurisdiction of CFIUS to include the review of joint ventures that
involve technology transfer, even if those joint ventures do not
result in control of a U.S. business.125 Currently, CFIUS does not
have the authority to review transactions that result in technology
transfer if they do not involve control. In addition, minority
investment as low as 10% would trigger CFIUS review as long as
the stake involved control.126 While Senator Cornyn made it clear
that he would not call out any country by name, he has indicated
that the bill would add a new country-specific framework that would

118. Id.
119. Covington & Burling, LLP, Update on CFIUS Developments: Proposed
Legislation and Reflections on CFIUS Under the Trump Administrations 1
(June
23,
2017),
www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/
2017/06/update_on_cfius_developments_proposed_legislation_and_reflections_
on_cfius_under_the_trump_administration.pdf.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Travalini, supra note 74, at 792.
122. Stewart, supra note 38.
123. Covington & Burling, LLP, supra note 119, at 2.
124. Diane Bartz, Leading U.S. Senator Urges Changes in Foreign
Investment Rules, THOMSON REUTERS (Jun. 26, 2017, 3:45 PM),
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-investment-cornyn/leading-u-s-senatorurges-changes-in-foreign-investment-rules-idUSKBN19H2I5.
125. Covington & Burling, LLP, supra note 119, at 2.
126. Id.
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require the committee to apply heightened scrutiny to certain
countries of concern, like China.127 Finally, although the legislation
does not single out specific technologies, an aide to the Senator
stated that AI technologies are an area of particular concern given
that the export control system has not yet figured out how to cover
them.128
At this time, there is still no clear departure from longstanding U.S. policy of openness to foreign investment. However, it
does appear that the stars have aligned for a new wave of targeted
investment restrictions. Although the increased restrictions may
not target Chinese investors by name, it seems apparent that the
motivations behind the restrictions are to stop Chinese companies
from acquiring U.S. companies for the purposes of technology
transfer. Senator Cornyn’s bill may assuage national security
concerns, but, by restricting investment, the bill could bring about
far reaching negative economic consequences for the U.S. economy.

V. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INVESTMENT
REGULATION
A. Reductions in Competitive Economic Advantage
If Congress enacts the FRRMR and places new restrictions on
Chinese investment, it may have a negative economic impact on the
U.S. AI industry and, in turn, have a negative impact on the U.S.
economy as a whole. 129 The impact of AI on productivity has the
potential to be transformative across industries, causing businesses
that fail to adapt or adopt the new technology to be undercut on
costs and lose significant market share130 As AI, and in particular
machine-learning applications, have the potential to drive
productivity gains in the manufacturing industry, the U.S. could
end up missing out on the innovations that create future
competitive economic advantages.131 Although this reduction in
competitive advantage may not be felt immediately due to current
U.S. technological superiority, erosion may begin with the reduction

127. Id. at 3.
128. Stewart, supra note 38.
129. See U.S. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, The National Artificial
Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan 15 (Oct. 2016),
www.nitrd.gov/PUBS/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf (reporting that AI
advancements are providing many positive benefits to society and are
increasing U.S. national economic competitiveness.).
130. Dr. Anand S. Rao & Gerard Verweij, Sizing the Prize: What’s the Real
Value of AI for Your Business and How Can You Capitalize?
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
INT’L
LTD.
5
(2017),
www.pwc.com/
gx/en/issues/data-and-analytics/publications/artificial-intelligence-study.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
131. Bughin, supra note 10, at 4.
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in the pool of venture capital for AI technology and the loss of
knowledge spillovers from Chinese companies operating in the U.S.
Placing restrictions on one of the biggest foreign investors in
the U.S. AI industry may effectively reduce the pool of venture
capital in the U.S. as well as reduce the potential for knowledge
spillovers as a result of Chinese investment. CFIUS review
effectively places a large burden on early-stage companies that may
be considering an infusion of Chinese investment.132 This would
likely reduce foreign investment because some companies would not
be willing to risk the financing delays that come with CFIUS
review.133 The recent U.S. government report downplays the
potential reduction in the pool of venture capital due to the fact that
Chinese investment still only makes up a small share of the total
venture investment in the technology sector.134 In an era of tighter
funding, however, Chinese investments are still a significant factor
in Silicon Valley venture capital funding. One AI start-up founder
who received funding from Tencent and other Chinese investors
acknowledged candidly that, “start-up fundraising in Silicon Valley
wouldn’t function without Chinese money.”135 If the U.S. acts to
place greater restrictions on foreign investment, it will reduce the
pool of venture capital and the U.S. economy may miss out on
funding the next great AI start-up company.
The U.S. regulatory action also has the potential to deprive the
U.S. AI industry of knowledge inputs from Chinese firms and
Chinese talent that can increase the competitiveness of the
industry. Focus on the transfer of technology from the U.S. to China
ignores the fact that U.S. companies can gain knowledge from
collaborating with Chinese companies. In the United States, much
of the emerging talent in the industry is Chinese, as Chinese
authors lead the world in publishing journal articles on “deep
learning,” which is a critical issue in developing AI.136 The
collaboration with Chinese scientists and entrepreneurs made
possible by Chinese investment provides an important input to
innovation in the U.S. industry. In addition, if Chinese investment
in the U.S. AI industry dries up, U.S. researchers may lose access
to the rich pool of Chinese datasets that are so valuable to machinelearning applications. China is rich in the data used to train these
systems due to the fact that there are fewer privacy restrictions to
132. Brown & Singh, supra note 3, at 26.
133. Id.
134. See Id. (Chinese total venture financing in the U.S. is 2-3%, and the
contribution to the technology mergers & acquisitions market is about 12% of
the total.).
135. Elizabeth Dwoskin, China is Flooding Silicon Valley with Cash. Here’s
What
Can
Go
Wrong,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
6,
2016),
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/new-wave-of-chinese-start-upinvestments-comes-with-complications/2016/08/05/2051db0e-505d-11e6-aa14e0c1087f7583_story.html?utm_term=.b6f2edbe0f43.
136. U.S. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, supra note 129, at 13.

2018]

Smart Machines and Smarter Policy

299

data collection than in Western countries.137 Indeed, Kai-Fu Lee
founder of Microsoft’s Beijing Research Lab, in his recruiting trip to
MIT in 2017, uses the fact that China has “way more data” to sell
students on starting their company in China instead of Silicon
Valley.138
Chinese companies that do continue to invest in U.S. AI
technology, despite new restrictions, will face increased transaction
costs and regulatory uncertainty. Regulatory uncertainty generally
deters business investment and creates cost uncertainty for foreign
investors. This uncertainty is partially created by the broad
definition of national security, making it increasingly difficult to
determine which investments will be declared security threats.139
Not only do potential foreign investors need to consider the
additional transaction costs and risks of security reviews, but also
the fact that additional concessions may be required to finalize the
transactions.140 The burdens of the current CFIUS process are
already placing a strain on potential foreign investment, additional
restrictions may discourage foreign investment further. The
combination of reductions to the pool of venture capital and the loss
of potential knowledge inputs, and increased transaction costs may
drag down start-up activity in the AI industry and rob the U.S.
economy of the future innovations that will drive productivity gains
and competitive advantage.

B. Relocation of Research and Development Centers
Abroad
The potential relocation of U.S. AI research and development
centers to other countries is another negative drawback to increases
in investment restrictions. The very nature of AI technology makes
it relatively easy to relocate these projects when favorable economic
conditions are available elsewhere. Participants in AI projects may
be located in multiple countries and have no formal contractual
relationship with one another.141 The low cost of infrastructure and
small physical footprint associated with AI projects means that
firms can simply move development work offshore if regulations
prove too onerous.142 In addition, attempts by any one country to
regulate participation in such projects may not impact the
development of such projects.
137. Will Knight, China’s AI Awakening, M.I.T. TECH. REV., 68 (Oct. 10,
2017), www.technologyreview.com/s/609038/chinas-ai-awakening/.
138. Id. at 69.
139. James F. Carroll, Back to The Future: Redefining The Foreign
Investment and National Security Act’s Conception of National Security, 23
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 167, 188 (2009).
140. Travalini, supra note 74, at 796.
141. Scherer, supra note 5, at 372.
142. Id.
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At the moment, investment in AI research and development
currently remains concentrated in a few technology hubs in the U.S.
and China, with Europe lagging far behind.143 However, China is
also helping to establish and fund new research and development
centers in Europe.144 If the U.S. enacts more restrictions on Chinese
investment, China may simply redirect that investment to Europe.
Indeed, it appears that Europe would be ready to step into any void
created by an American abdication of leadership in innovation.
Currently, the only strong AI start-up cluster in Europe is in
London, but start-up activity in Germany, France, and the Nordic
region is growing. In addition, Facebook is already opening an AI
lab in Paris that will supplement its U.S. facilities and make it
easier to recruit European talent.145 Google recently invested $4.5
million in the Montreal Institute for Learning Algorithms, a
research lab at the University of Montreal, Canada.146 If legislation
is overly aggressive, these U.S. AI companies may even consider
relocating their research and development activities overseas to
take advantage of talent and data synergies that are restricted in
the U.S.
The relocation of AI research and development centers abroad
would also reduce the Defense Department’s access to nextgeneration technology as the new breakthroughs would
increasingly occur outside of the country. Investment restrictions
would further increase the distance between U.S. technology
industry and the government, which is already strained due to
fallout from the Edward Snowden affair.147 At present, Peter Theil’s
company, Palantir, is one of the few U.S. companies that is working
with the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx)
Facility, which incorporates AI into defense applications.148 The
lack of cooperation between the U.S. government and private
industry undercuts U.S. security by reducing opportunity for
synergies with the very same domestic commercial companies that
the military depends upon for “off-the-shelf technology
procurement.”149 In this manner, improving the economic position
of U.S. commercial industry and keeping research and development
close to home has the side-effect of improving national security.150
Therefore, not only would restricting investment have the potential
to drive research abroad, and cause the U.S. industry to lose out on

143. Bughin, supra note 10, at 13.
144. Alderman & Ray, supra note 13.
145. Bughin, supra note 10, at 10.
146. Id.
147. Allen & Chan, supra note 17, at 52.
148. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
149. Fitzgerald, supra note 56, at 70-71.
150. Kurtis J. Zinger, An Overreaction that Destroyed an Industry: The Past,
Present, and Future of U.S. Satellite Export Controls, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 351,
375 (2015).
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new jobs created by this investment, it would also weaken the U.S.
security position.

C. Relocation of the Expert Talent Pool
If research and development centers are relocated to other
countries, top experts in AI will be sure to follow, reducing the pool
of AI talent in the United States. The U.S. government recognizes
that in order for strategic AI research goals to be met, the U.S. will
need a substantial research and development workforce.151 Because
most of that workforce will need to be reskilled to exploit
advantages created by AI, countries seeking to become global hubs
of AI development will need to compete to attract the best talent.152
The U.S. strategic report recognizes that talent is in short supply
and that universities and private industry are already engaged in a
battle to recruit top AI talent.153
Many of the true experts in the field are already being snapped
up by giants like Alibaba, Baidu, Amazon, Facebook, and Google.
Gansha Wu, former director of Intel’s lab in China, left his post to
create Uisee Tech, a start-up self-driving car company.154 Qi Lu,
head of Microsoft’s AI group, left to join Baidu in January 2017.155
When Tencent opened its AI research facility in Seattle, it was
headed by former Microsoft scientist, Yu Dong.156 Tencent, in
particular, is luring talent to its home AI lab in Shenzhen, China
where it already has more than fifty researchers and 200
engineers.157 Shenzhen has become a hub of AI research itself, with
the headquarters of Chinese technology companies like Huawei and
ZTE, in addition to Tencent.158 In fact, competition for talent is so
ferocious, that these tech giants are resorting to actively buying AI
start-ups as a way to acquire technology experts. Some companies
are paying between $5 to $10 million for each “acqui-hire.”159 The
war for experts in AI has already begun and, with Chinese
companies making sizable gains, U.S. actions to drive away one of
the industry’s biggest investors could encourage top talent to leave
the United States.
Many in the industry believe that America’s best chance at
retaining talent and superiority in the AI industry is to maintain
the “vibrant, open, R&D culture [that] has made it the global hub”
151. U.S. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 129, at 35.
152. Bughin, supra note 10, at 4.
153. U.S. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 129, at 35.
154. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
155. Id.
156. THOMSON REUTERS, A Chinese Tech Giant is Setting Up an A.I.
Research Lab on Amazon’s Home Turf (May 2, 2017, 3:03 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/02/tencent-ai-research-lab-seattle.html.
157. Id.
158. Knight, supra note 137, at 70.
159. Bughin, supra note 10, at 11.
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for ideas and investment.160 The U.S. has fostered a culture of
technological innovation in large part by embracing new ideas
regardless of the nationality of the idea’s creator. However, recent
rhetoric by the Trump Administration on immigration and the
proposal for reduction of H1B visas make it less likely these Chinese
nationals, or other foreign nationals with STEM degrees, will want
to apply their skills in the U.S. even if they have the opportunity.161
When coupled with hostility to Chinese investors, these negative
perceptions have the potential over time to decrease the likelihood
that the U.S. will be able to attract and retain the best talent in AI.
Canada launched a $117 million campaign in 2017 to attract
scholars unhappy with political trends like Brexit and the election
of Donald Trump.162 The campaign is already having notable
success, landing high-level STEM researchers from several
prominent American universities.163 Europe also stands ready to
absorb top talent leaving the United States. After his election in
early 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron seized on this
perception and made an unprecedented public plea to lure U.S.
scientists, academics, and entrepreneurs concerned with
restrictions on science and innovation.164
Analysts have used a chess analogy to describe the current
distribution of expert talent in the AI industry, saying that while
the grandmasters are still in the United States, the Chinese have
increasingly more master level scientists.165 Although the U.S. may
have the advantage in talent at present, the Chinese grandmasters
of the next generation will be less likely to apply their talents in the
U.S. with increased restrictions on Chinese investment. Moreover,
a restrictive investment environment driven by anti-immigrant
sentiment may discourage new STEM talent from coming to the
U.S. and discourage current talent from staying. Therefore, given
the global competitive landscape for recruitment, restricting
investment from Chinese companies would be counterproductive to
the goal of retaining top AI talent.

160. Simonite, supra note 37.
161. Id.
162. Press Release, TRI-AGENCY INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMS SECRETARIAT OF
CANADA, Canada’s Brain Gain. Round 2., (Mar. 29, 2018), www.canada150.
chairs-chaires.gc.ca/news_room-salle_de_presse/news_releasescommuniques_de_presse/2018/march-mars-2018-eng.aspx.
163. Id.
164. Macron Offers Refuge in France to U.S. Scientists, entrepreneurs,
THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2017, 12:12 PM), www.reuters.com/article/usfrance-election-macron/macron-offers-refuge-in-france-to-u-s-scientistsentrepreneurs-idUSKBN15J0RQ.
165. Markoff & Rosenberg, supra note 29.
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D. Potential Trade Retaliation to Investment
Restrictions
A final important potential economic drawback to restrictions
on Chinese investment in the U.S. is that it may trigger a
retaliatory response. China already has the perception that its
companies face higher scrutiny and have been disproportionately
targeted by CFIUS. Over the 2010 to 2014 period, Chinese investors
have accounted for 19% of the transactions reviewed by CFIUS,
despite the fact that Chinese investment in the U.S. was
considerably less than that from some EU nations.166 Chinese
companies accounted for only about 0.3% of all foreign direct
investment in the United States from 2011 to 2013, but voluntarily
filed 54 CFIUS notices, which was more than any other country.167
In contrast, companies from the United Kingdom constituted 18%
of foreign investment in the U.S. during this time period, but only
accounted for 49 notices.168 The substantial amount of voluntary
filings suggests that Chinese companies are approaching the U.S.
market with caution, but still face significant hurdles due to a
disproportionate amount of scrutiny from CFIUS.
Ratcheting up restrictions on Chinese investors already
targeted by higher scrutiny may provoke China to enact retaliatory
restrictions on U.S. companies investing in China. China has
already shown that it is more than willing to respond with
restrictive measures of its own when it feels that its companies are
being unfairly targeted. China hinted at this possibility when it
responded to potential U.S. probe of Chinese intellectual property
violations by saying that it would “resort to all proper measures” to
defend its rights.169 Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce further advised
that protectionist moves would damage bilateral economic relations
as well as “hurt the business interests of companies in both
countries.”170 These statements are not empty rhetoric as China has
a history of responding in kind to what it deems as U.S.
protectionist trade measures. Whether it be in response to increased
tariffs, anti-dumping actions, or increased regulatory scrutiny,
China has shown that they are more than willing to use their
economic leverage to make the U.S. pay a price for what it deems as
actions designed to hurt their economic interest.171
166. Jackson, supra note 91, at 22.
167. Webster, supra note 76, at 269.
168. Id.
169. Andrew Mayeda, China Signals Retaliation After Trump’s Call for
Trade Review, BLOOMBERG POL. (Aug. 14, 2017), www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-08-14/trump-calls-for-review-of-china-ip-practices-as-tradeties-sour.
170. Id.
171. Kevin Hamlin et al., When the U.S. Moves on Trade, China Hits Back
Fast, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2016, 10:01 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/
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If the U.S. acts to impose new restrictions on Chinese
companies investing in the U.S., the most damaging response may
be simply to restrict the access of U.S. companies to the lucrative
Chinese market. Losing access to a market with billions of potential
customers is what U.S. tech companies fear the most. Silicon Valley
firms are already hesitant to be seen working too closely with the
U.S. government for fear of losing access to the Chinese market. 172
Larger firms like Google and Facebook are already negotiating
concessions with Chinese government in exchange for market
access and action by the U.S. government could further reduce their
leverage.173 A regulatory move that has negative consequences for
U.S. businesses abroad could further widen the gulf between the
tech industry and the U.S. government.
Moreover, singling out China for new restrictions, as Senator
Cornyn does, is unnecessarily provocative because CFIUS already
keeps a list of countries of concern. Mandating such a list may
simply create more uncertainty for foreign investors and encourage
more elaborate disguising of problematic transactions.174 Given that
U.S. firms are the largest global foreign direct investors, new
restrictions could also raise questions about openness of the U.S. to
foreign direct investment from other countries.175 Although it is
unclear how increased CFIUS action targeting China would impact
U.S. direct investment worldwide, new restrictions could encourage
other countries to ratchet up their protectionist trade measures.
Given the risk of damage to U.S. economic interests from
retaliation, it would be counterproductive for the U.S. to single out
China for increased investment scrutiny.
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174. Matthew P. Goodman, Global Economics Monthly: The China
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E. Recommendations for a Smarter Policy
Instead of increasing restrictions on Chinese investment in AI,
a smarter policy would be to utilize the existing strengths of CFIUS,
better fund government research organizations, and adopt an
immigration policy that attracts top talent. Mitigation agreements
and screening procedures utilized by CFIUS have shown that they
can be effective in reducing the national security risk of foreign
investment transactions. CFIUS should scrutinize transactions in a
non-discriminatory, case-by-case manner according to concrete
evidence of national security risk.176 CFIUS should be able to
maintain its flexibility by utilizing mitigation agreements, like
selling off sensitive technology to domestic buyers, to reduce the
potential for AI technology transfer to governments that are
strategic competitors of the United States. For instance, in the
Unocal-CNOOC transaction instead of effectively blocking the
acquisition, CFIUS could have ordered Unocal to sell its seismic
technology business to a third party, which would have denied the
Chinese government access to this sensitive technology.177
Structuring the transaction in this manner would have been an
effective non-discriminatory utilization of the committee’s powers
that would be less likely to provoke a trade row.
If the concern is that certain foreign nationals cannot be
trusted to refrain from the transferring advanced technology back
to their home country, the appropriate course of action may be to
better utilize CFIUS screening procedures. Employees of foreign
corporations can be screened to help identify potential security
vulnerabilities without blocking acquisitions.178 This can be done
through current CFIUS processes and may avoid the negative
publicity that has the potential to kill the investment deal.
Instead of focusing on curtailing China’s access to nextgeneration technology, the U.S. government should focus on
providing funding and support for its own AI industry. The National
Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan is
a good start, but in order for the goals of the report to be achieved,
the agencies involved in technological research and development
need to be properly funded. China is putting huge amounts of
funding behind its strategic “Made in China 2025” plan, whereas
the budget plan introduced by the Trump Administration in 2017
contains huge cuts to the National Science Foundation (NSF), an
agency that distributes grants for scientific research.179 What’s
176. Webster, supra note 76, at 246.
177. Id. at 244.
178. Carroll, supra note 139, at 199.
179. Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Trump’s Budget Seeks Huge Cuts to
Science and Medical Research, Disease Prevention, THE WASH. POST (May 22,
2017),
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more, the same budget only slightly increased funding for the DOD
science and technology budget, which includes programs like
DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.180
Andrew Ng, who led advances in Facebook’s AI program, did so with
the help of DARPA and the NSF.181 If the DOD has sufficient
funding to produce technological innovations of its own, it may not
need to rely heavily on “off-the-shelf” military technology.
Therefore, funding programs that contribute to major advances in
technology will enhance the U.S. economy as well as contribute to
U.S. strategic national security goals.
In the long run, however, a smarter policy would also include
enacting immigration reform that makes it easier for AI experts
that are foreign nationals to stay in the U.S. and contribute to
American technological innovation. Many STEM (science,
technology, engineering & mathematics) graduates from U.S.
universities that are foreign nationals might prefer to stay in Silicon
Valley and start new companies if they were able to obtain green
card status. This policy might entail increasing the pool of H1B
visas in exchange for a commitment from graduates to work in the
U.S. for a certain number of years. In short, if the U.S. can better
utilize the mitigation and screening tools already at the disposal of
CFIUS, support its private industry with fully-funded government
research and development organizations, and institute immigration
reform that helps retain the best talent, the U.S. AI industry will be
able to manage national security risks while avoiding the economic
drawbacks of tighter regulation.

VI. CONCLUSION
Artificial intelligence is an incredible new technology with the
power to transform our entire world. Its commercial applications
can be as simple as playing your favorite song in the morning at the
command of your voice or as complex as sifting through numerous
data sets to find patterns that lead to productivity improvements in
manufacturing processes. Unfortunately, the transformative
nature of AI also means that it has tremendous national security
implications. AI’s potential to alter the balance of economic and
military superiority in the world means that there will be a global
strategic competition to obtain and harness this technology.
Although the U.S. currently enjoys an edge in the research and
development of AI, current policies may not do enough to maintain
that technological edge. The Chinese government is devoting
massive resources to the research and development of AI in order to
departments/?utm_term=.8a704c0230b1.
180. Bruce Sterling, Trump’s Cutting Military Science?! Hey, That’s Serious,
WIRED (Jun. 2, 2017, 3:41 AM), www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/
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181. Simonite, supra note 37.

2018]

Smart Machines and Smarter Policy

307

catch up to U.S. technological capabilities. The ambitious goals set
by the Chinese government have caused Chinese tech companies to
invest in the U.S. AI industry as a way to acquire the latest
generation of AI technology. The open nature of AI technology, the
integrated U.S. and Chinese AI industries, the “off-the-shelf” nature
of military procurement, and the close connection of Chinese tech
companies to the Chinese Communist Party have created an
environment that funnels advanced technology directly from U.S.
tech companies to Chinese government entities. This transfer
pipeline has understandably sparked concerns in Washington,
which have led to calls to curtail Chinese investment in AI through
CFIUS. While CFIUS is a sophisticated committee that has the
ability to weigh and mitigate the national security risk of foreign
investment transactions, oftentimes it has been used as a blunt
instrument to block transactions with Chinese investors due to
overblown national security concerns.
While proposed CFIUS reforms have the potential to address
legitimate security risks, they also have the potential to create even
greater economic drawbacks. These drawbacks include
handicapping the AI industry with capital and knowledge restraints
that have the potential to reduce U.S. competitive economic
advantage. In addition, increased foreign investment restrictions
may cause research and development centers and expert talent to
relocate overseas where they can more easily collaborate with
Chinese companies and the best minds regardless of nationality.
Finally, China may use its economic clout and respond to increases
in investment restrictions by curtailing the access of U.S. companies
to the Chinese market.
Instead of counterproductive investment restrictions, the U.S.
should consider a smarter AI policy, which would include better
utilizing the flexible mitigation and screening procedures of CFIUS
to mitigate national security risks. The U.S. should more fully fund
its government research and development organizations to support
and collaborate with private entrepreneurs in the industry instead
of slashing funding. Most importantly, the U.S. should craft an
immigration policy that encourages foreign nationals with
advanced technology degrees to stay in the U.S. and contribute to
U.S. innovation. The age of smart machines needs a new age of
smarter U.S. policy.182 Policymakers need to make sure that
overstated security risks are not weighed more heavily than longrun economic gains. Otherwise, this regulatory overreach has the
potential to set back the AI industry, the U.S. economy, and U.S.
national security interests for generations to come.
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